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This paper examines the regional investment practices of institutional investors in the 
commercial real estate office market in 1998 and 2003 in England and Wales.   
Consistent with previous studies in the US the findings show that investors concentrate 
their holdings in a few (urban) areas and that this concentration has become more 
pronounced as investors have rationalised their portfolio holdings.  The findings also 
indicate that office investment does not fully correlate with the UK urban hierarchy, as 
measured by population, but is focused on urban areas with high service sector 
employment.  Finally, the pre-eminence of the City of London and West End office 
markets as the key focus of institutional investment is confirmed. 
 








Geographical Concentration in the Institutional Market for Office Property 





Real estate professionals consistently claim that the most important element in 
property performance is “location, location, location”.  The desire for some kind of 
spatial (geographical) diversity would seem to be a fairly fundamental principle in real 
estate portfolio management.  Diversity however, is difficult to achieve because of two 
problems: measuring risk consistently across and between geographic areas, and 
establishing boundaries.  Such an analysis in, for example, the UK, based on counties 
or local authorities will be limited in some sense by the fact that the geographic units 
are not necessarily economically cohesive and may be too large to be appropriate 
bases for a strategy of investment diversification and balance.  This has led real estate 
researchers to question whether conventionally defined geographical ‘regions’ are 
appropriate for real estate portfolio analysis purposes, a view that is not new but has 
gained more mainstream acceptance, especially in the US.  In the UK, even though 
McNamara and Morrell (1994) highlighted the need to link the economic performance 
of ‘locations’ with real estate performance over a decade ago, little work has been done 
to investigate the structure of this relationship in any systematic way.  Such evidence 
as there is in the UK suggests that investors concentrate their real estate holdings in 
preferred ‘locations’ and that this concentration is not driven by economic 
considerations. 
 
In the US, Shilton and Stanley (1995) found that institutional investors are highly 
concentrated in a very few (major) metropolitan areas.  Shilton et al. (1996) reported 
that in the case of the NCREIF
1 investment universe in the United States, only 30 
counties (less than 1% of the total) have been the premier locations for investment by 
members of NCREIF.  Malpezzi and Shilling (2000) found that institutional investors tilt 
(i.e. ‘overweight’) their portfolio allocations towards locations where the share of local 
employment in business services, finance, insurance, and real estate, and 
transportation is relatively high (compared to national averages).  This is a view shared 
by Smith et al. (2004). 
 
Although research in the UK is much less developed, it draws similar conclusions to the 
US, with the results implying at least four conclusions.  First, like their US counterparts, 
UK office investors have specific areas of the country as ‘favourite’ locations for their 
portfolio selections, especially in the South East.  Second, location appears to have 
been a stronger influence on investment flows into real estate investment than 
economic performance (Key et al., 1998).  Third, there appears to be a geographical 
dimension for the office and industrial property types but not for retail property (see for 
example, Cullen, 1993; Hoesli et al., 1997 and Hamelink et al., 2000).  Finally, a 
number of studies clearly identify the central London office markets: the City, Mid-town 
and West End as significant “property regions” in their own right (see Cullen, 1993; 
Hoesli et al., 1997; Hamelink et al., 2000 and Andrew et al., 2005). 
 
In the UK, at an anecdotal level, this overall situation is in many ways common 
knowledge; ‘everyone knows’ about the concentration of investment in Offices in 
London and the South East, and that the Central London Office markets are 
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significantly different.  In fact the form and extent of these investment decisions is not 
well documented or understood.  The recent availability of two different, but related, 
databases make it possible to study the situation in more objective detail, at least for 
England and Wales.  This paper therefore examines the extent of ‘spatial’ 
concentration in Office portfolios by real estate investing institutions in England and 
Wales at two points in time; 1998 and 2003. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  The next section reviews previous 
studies of spatial investment and diversification.  In Section 3 the principal datasets 
used are discussed.  Section 4 presents the results.  Section 5 concludes the paper 
and suggests future areas of research. 
 
 
2. ‘Spatial’  Diversification 
 
The issue of spatial or geographical diversification has been the subject of 
considerable research, principally because geographic diversification has been shown 
to offer risk reduction benefits within the real estate portfolio, probably because of local 
market effects (see Viezer, 2000) for a comprehensive review).  It is not always the 
case that the best diversification results come from investing in geographically remote 
markets.  Equally, markets with similar economic land use are not always spatially 
clustered.  Pursuing a ‘pure’ administrative geographic diversification, big investments 
could be made in the City of London and the City of Edinburgh office markets with a 
claim to be ‘geographically diversified’ but in fact not be diversified because those 
markets share similar economic drivers that make them behave the same way (i.e. 
both, as capital cities, accommodate a large number of government offices and both 
contain large amounts of office space for the banking and insurance industries). 
 
Real estate is a derived demand, (Redfearn, 2000), and as such, changing local 
fundamentals, such as employment, income, population, etc., generate changes in real 
estate market conditions.  The degree of correlation between outcomes in any two real 
estate markets is therefore a function of the extent to which their economic 
fundamentals are similar.  In this way the local economic composition of an area 
influences systematically the correlation of movements in real estate markets between 
regions, independent of physical proximity.  This relationship is consistent with the 
theory that aggregate industry shocks are transmitted to local economies as a function 
of the types of economic activity undertaken by an urban area.  Diversification 
strategies need to be more sophisticated than simply spreading investment across 
great distances.  The assessment of portfolio risk in any real estate market therefore 
requires an understanding of the economic risks to which the local markets are 
exposed.  This means that investment strategies based on naïve administrative 
geographic groupings built solely on contiguity add little, if anything, to a successful 
real estate diversification strategy (Hartzell et al., 1986 and Goetzmann and Wachter, 
1995). 
 
In contrast, economically based real estate diversification strategies seem to be more 
successful, and research has tended to investigate regions defined by economic base; 
classifying (urban) areas in terms of function rather than administratively defined 
boundaries.  These studies show that economically defined areas are to be preferred 
technically to administrative regions as the basis for diversification (see Hartzell et al., 
1986; Hartzell et al., 1987; Wurtzebach, 1988; Malizia and Simmons, 1991; Mueller 
and Ziering, 1992; Mueller, 1993; Ziering and Hess, 1995 and Lee and Byrne, 1998 
amongst others).  The argument is that investors should think of economic 
diversification as providing additional portfolio risk reduction over and above the 
benefits provided by traditional geographic diversification.   3
 
The economic regional analysis approach appears to have several distinct advantages 
over a simple geographical analysis in evaluating regional real estate investment 
opportunities and risks.  The method allows a more consistent risk measurement 
between geographic units and enables the portfolio manager to develop a 
geographically diversified portfolio through the use of economically cohesive regions.  
The approach enables managers to evaluate individual local markets while retaining a 
broader, regional view of economic risk.  Implementing such an approach requires 
some sort of ‘classification’ of urban areas.  The intention is usually to try to develop 
structures which will optimise the geographical diversification in real estate portfolios.  
This has led to the use of clustering techniques to try and group together urban areas 
that exhibit similar characteristics and then to try and give the clusters clear and 
recognisable labels (see for example, Ziering and Hess, 1995; Goetzmann and 
Wachter, 1995; Hoesli et al.,1997; Nelson and Nelson, 2003 and Smith et al., 2004). 
 
Even then, knowing how a local economy is performing does not necessarily give a 
good indication as to how the commercial real estate market is performing, because 
differences in demand and supply conditions can weaken the link between the local 
economy and the local property market.  For example, job growth converts into 
demand growth differently in different areas, depending on the local economy and skill 
base, while real estate demand growth translates into rent increases differently 
depending on the availability of developable land.  Economic growth and rental growth 
may be only loosely related.  Liang and McIntosh (1998) found that employment growth 
contributes to real estate return only in the short term (e.g. one year), but there was no 
relationship between expected return and employment growth over the long term (e.g. 
10 years).  However, they found that employment risks, as measured by employment 
growth beta or volatility, are linked positively to real estate risks, beta and volatility.  
They therefore concluded that the analysis of local market employment growth is 
important for real estate decision making because employment growth risk is related 
positively to real estate risk.  Investors should not however price employment growth 
too aggressively into their long-term real estate investments because employment 
growth is only positively related significantly to real estate return in the short term. 
 
Key et al. (1998) drew similar conclusions for the UK.  Using economic data from the 
Local Economic Profiling System developed by Public and Corporate Economic 
Consultants (PACEC) they investigated the correlation between economic and property 
market performance in the UK.  Their analysis showed that the volume of office 
investment in individual local authorities in the UK is weakly associated with total 
employment, but quite strongly linked to total Financial and Business Services (FBS) 
employment, especially in London and its surrounding satellites, which account for 60% 
of total capital value in all Districts listed.  Additionally, they found there was only a 
weak association between long-run office property returns and employment growth, 
while industrials showed no associations between employment change and long-run 
performance. 
 
The contemporary position is thus to try to define ‘regional areas’ based on economic 
function, rather than administrative convenience, since it will be the economic structure 
that will lead to differences in demand and hence property performance.  In spite of this 
view of the importance of economic-based diversification on portfolio performance, little 
is known of the diversification practices of investors, especially in the UK.  In contrast to 
the recent discussions about the advantages of economic-based real estate activity the 
little evidence that is available suggests that investors concentrate their real estate 
holdings in preferred regions when diversifying their portfolios and that this 
concentration is not driven by economic considerations. 
   4
In the US, Shilton and Stanley (1995) found that institutional investors are highly 
concentrated in a very few (major) metropolitan areas.  They reported that in 1993, in 
the case of the NCREIF investment universe, although properties were located overall 
in a total of 273 US counties, 38% of properties were in only 10 counties and 55% in 30 
counties, a situation that has hardly changed since 1993.  For example, Liang and 
McIntosh (2000) find that while the share of NCREIF investment in the top 30 MSAs 
has fluctuated over time it still stood at 75% in 1998.  Frost et al. (2005) found for 2004 
that 70-80% of the major institutional-quality real estate was still concentrated in only 
38 urban areas. 
 
Shilton et al. (1996) later examined private investment by county, and confirmed that 
30 (of a total of 3140) counties accounted for over sixty percent of NCREIF real estate 
investment.  They found that this high degree of geographic concentration cannot be 
explained by population size or total employment within the counties or metropolitan 
areas, but other factors, such as past growth, and/or amenity levels may need to be 
examined to explain such concentration. 
 
In a subsequent paper Shilton and Stanley (1996) estimated a stepwise logit model to 
predict which counties would have positive NCREIF investment and found that larger 
and richer counties were more likely to attract investment, but that (perhaps 
surprisingly) counties with higher population densities were less likely to attract 
investment, ceteris paribus.  They also estimated a stepwise least squares model for 
square footage of NCREIF investment (conditional on positive investment), for 
warehouses, office, and research and development parks.  Results varied somewhat 
by property type but were broadly consistent with the logit results. 
 
Similar conclusions are drawn by Smith et al. (2004) who group the numerous US 
metropolitan areas into eight clusters based on economic characteristics, geographic 
proximity and absolute size.  They find the top seven clusters are composed of just 35 
MSAs and account for the vast majority of public and private real estate investment.  
For instance, they find that at the end of 2003 the top 35 accounted for about 94% of 
private investments and about 80% of estimated public investment.  The eighth group 
of MSAs beyond the top 35 are called opportunistic markets, as they collectively 
represent only 5% of institutional real estate investments.   
 
Smith et al. (2004) also find that more than 60% of private real estate and over half of 
public property investments lie in the 10 largest US metro areas by population, 
although less than one-third of the population lives in these areas.  The top 30 metro 
areas represent about half of the US population, but account for more than 90% of 
private investments and almost 75% of public holdings.  In fact, of the 361 MSAs 
private investors hold properties in only about 80 or of them.  They concluded that… 
“institutional investors prefer to concentrate their investments in the largest metro 
areas.” 
 
This pattern is also seen by Byrne et al. (2002) for business centre executive suites, 
also in the US.  Using a database of 1,692 business centres offering executive suites, 
for which there was adequate information on ownership and location, they find that 
executive suites highly concentrated in just a few MSAs.  A quarter of the centres in the 
database are found in just five cities, while the top 12 MSAs account for nearly half the 
centres, while over half of the 309 MSAs observed have no recorded executive suites
2. 
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92% of the £3.7bn total investment in 2005 (Strutt & Parker, 2005).  Furthermore, of the 63 Business Parks 
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To measure the extent of the over- or under-representation of the executive suites in a 
particular urban area, they calculate a widely used measure of locational concentration; 
location quotients (LQs), (Isard, et al., 1960).  For example, the population LQ for 
executive suites in MSAi would be calculated as: 
 
Executive suites in MSAi 
Executive suites in US 
   L Q i =    ────────────────     (1) 
Population in MSAi 
Population in US 
 
Thus, an LQ of 1.0 would imply that the number of executive suites in the metropolitan 
area was proportional to the population share; an LQ greater than 1.0 suggests over-
representation and an LQ less than 1.0 suggests under-representation relative to the 
population in a given MSA. 
 
Using this approach, they found that 12 MSAs had population and employment LQs 
greater than 2.5.  That is, 12 MSAs show levels of concentration two and half times that 
predicted by population and employment spread across the US.  Then, using 
regression analysis, they tested a number of models to explain the presence of 
executive suites in a particular urban area.  They found that the number of executive 
suites is significantly related to business services employment and economic and 
demographic growth and negatively related to a squared employment term and a 
number of Million City dummies.  That is, there is a non-linear relationship between the 
number of executive suites and size, as measured by employment or city size, with the 
number of executive suites concentrated in the more economic and demographic 
growth cities, consistent with much of the prior research on the clustering of economic 
activity and office dynamics. 
 
A few studies in the US have examined the differences between the geographical 
holdings of public and private real estate investors and indicate that private NCREIF 
investment is more heavily concentrated than public REIT
3 investment and is focused 
in different MSAs.  Holden and Redding (1994) for example, examined the portfolios of 
the 25 largest publicly traded equity REITs, representing 88% by value of the REIT 
universe at the end of 1992, to determine their level of diversification by property type 
and geographic area.  They conclude that although the investments of these REITs are 
distributed over many cities and property types, the distribution varies significantly from 
the composition of both the national stock and the NCREIF data base, for two reasons.  
First, the surveyed REITs held more retail and apartments but significantly less 
industrial and office property compared with the national distribution because seven of 
the 25 REITs surveyed were invested in a single property type.  Secondly they find that 
these REITs not only held properties in 83 of the 100 largest metropolitan areas but 
they also owned properties in an additional 159 smaller markets.  The value of 
investments in these additional cities accounted for 22% of the total value of REIT 
properties.  In other words, one-fifth of REIT properties by value were in smaller 
markets.  In contrast, institutional-grade real estate held by NCREIF members is almost 
exclusively focussed in the largest 100 metropolitan areas.   
 
Smith et al. (2004) find that public real estate holdings are more widely distributed than 
those of private investors, with about 15% of public holdings by value within 
metropolitan areas not included in the top 35 MSAs at the end of 1993.  In contrast, the 
5.5% share of private real estate holdings not in the top 35 MSAs is concentrated in 
only 25 additional markets.  Nonetheless, about 84% of the estimated value of public 
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real estate holdings is in the same preferred metro areas as those of private investors.  
In an update, to account for federal government changes in the definition of urban 
metropolitan areas, Hess and Liang (2005b) continued to find results similar to those 
reported earlier in 2004. 
 
Malpezzi and Shilling (2000) argued that the prudent man rule in the US, which holds 
fund managers personally liable for losses on individual investments, forces pension 
fund real estate investors to concentrate their holdings in ‘high-quality’ (low risk) real 
estate markets that are easy to defend in court.  In contrast, publicly traded REIT 
managers are much less constrained in their investment holdings.  They contended 
that private real estate investment will be more concentrated than public real estate 
investment.  To examine this issue, they compare the institutional holdings of public 
(REIT) and private (NCREIF) real estate holdings using cross-sectional data for 1996 
by calculating real estate LQs.  They find that there are a large number of MSAs which 
have no REIT (public) investment, and a greater number which have no NCREIF 
(private) investment, that is, both public and private real estate investors concentrate 
their holdings in relatively few markets.  The average LQs for private investors across 
all MSAs is about 0.35, when a value of one would be expected if investors diversified 
completely.  Thus, NCREIF investors do not fully exploit the low covariance between 
different regions and cities that is known to exist in the US real estate market.  In 
contrast, the average weight for REITs was fairly close to one, which indicates that 
REITs are much more diversified in their real estate portfolios than NCREIF investors.
4  
None of the top five private investment markets (San Francisco, Washington, D.C., 
Norfolk, VA, Charlotte, NC and Memphis,TN) were the same as the top five public 
investment markets (Atlanta, GA, Richmond, VA, Saginaw, MI, Raleigh, NC and 
Allentown, PA).  Only Atlanta, Washington, Nashville and Indianapolis made the top 15 
of both lists.  Public real estate investors concentrate on different markets from private 
investors.  Finally, as hypothesised, they find that although both public and private 
investors tilt towards ‘quality’, the tilt is much more pronounced in the case of private 
investors.  Indeed, private investors weight ‘high quality’ locations five times more than 
public real estate investors! 
 
They next develop a tobit model for each investor group to examine which variables 
explain their holdings in the MSAs.  Using the ‘quality’ variable and a number of 
employment characteristics for each MSA, they find not only that ‘quality’ is a 
significant determinant of investment in the MSA but, for both public and private real 
estate investors, economic structure matters. 
 
The differences in geographical holdings between the public and private investors can 
be explained by the smaller capital base of public real estate funds and the existing 
presence of the major institutional investors in the largest metropolitan areas.  REITs 
are forced to concentrate their holdings in (relatively) smaller metropolitan areas, where 
competition from institutional investors is reduced significantly and market dominance 
can be achieved more easily.  In addition, although the smaller metropolitan areas tend 
to relatively less diversified economically, and so are more vulnerable to economic 
downturns, but they are less integrated than the large metropolitan areas preferred by 
the private investors.  Although public funds focus on smaller more volatile regions they 
are actually more diversified in their real estate portfolios than direct investors, who 
concentrate their portfolios in relatively few large interrelated metropolitan areas. 
 
The difference in the geographical real estate holdings of public and private investors in 
the US has however narrowed.  Wilkerson (1998) found that from 1993 to 1997 there 
was a significant shift in the ownership of real estate in the 60 major metropolitan areas 
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of the US from private to public.  The apartment sector saw the greatest change, from a 
3.3 percent share at the end of 1993, to 11.1 percent by the end of 1997.  On the other 
hand the retail sector, which in 1993 had the greatest percentage of property in REIT 
hands, had grown comparatively slowly, rising from 4.6 percent to 8.7 percent, because 
of reduced acquisitions and generally declining values.  The warehouse sector also 
increased dramatically, from a mere 2.0 percent share in 1993 to 9.3 percent by 1997.  
Finally, acquisitions in the office sector increased the amount of office space held 
publicly from 1.1 percent to 7.9 percent.  Hess and Liang (2005a) confirm this, finding 
that REITs increased their market penetration into all property types from 1995 to 2003 
at the expense of private investors. 
 
The increased growth in public ownership in the sectors, however, is not matched 
across all the regions because of factors such as cost considerations; existing 
dominance by other real estate investors, or poor market characteristics.  For instance, 
Wilkerson (1998) argues that REITs are effectively barred from the very largest 
markets, such as the Los Angeles apartment and Denver retail markets, as it would 
take an enormous amount of absolute dollar investment to generate a marginal 
increase in the percentage of ownership.  In other markets, which were already 
dominated by institutional investors, such as the Boston apartment and the Kansas City 
office markets, Wilkerson (1998) found that public ownership was low.  Since REITs 
need to grow their funds from operations (FFO) as fast as possible in the face of daily 
pricing, they need to avoid markets that will reduce current income and dilute any 
future growth.  Hence, Wilkerson (1998) found that REITs avoided metropolitan areas 
where occupancy rates and rent levels are low.  Nonetheless, whereas at year-end 
1993, the REITs had no exposure in 25 of the 60 largest metropolitan areas, by 1997 
this had fallen to eight.  Additionally, Wilkerson (1998) found that by 1997 retail REITs 
were in all of these 60 major metro areas.  
 
In comparison to the quite extensive work carried out in the US, research in the UK has 
been much less developed.  While it is necessary to be aware of the major differences 
in the size and structure of the two real estate markets, such studies as there have 
been show rather similar kinds of results.  In the UK there appears to be a geographical 
dimension to the office and industrial property types but not for retail property.  For 
example, Cullen (1993) used cluster analysis techniques on 5500 properties from the 
Investment Property Databank (IPD) database, and found that industrial property is 
relatively homogenous across the UK, and retail properties partitioned more on 
ownership and lease terms rather than on any regional basis.  In contrast the office 
market displayed a distinct geographical structure.  In a similar vein, Hoesli et al. 
(1997) and Hamelink et al. (2000), using quarterly data from 1977-1995, find that there 
appears to be a geographical dimension to office and industrial property types but none 
for retail property.  Jackson and White (2005) find that the classification of markets 
based on the government’s Standard Regions of the UK, or those used by IPD, do not 
conform to the retail clusters developed from local market rent data.  In contrast, the 
office market clusters closely follow the three super-region classification of the UK 
office market (London, Rest of the South East and the Rest of the UK).  Whereas retail 
markets in the UK show no geographical component, office markets do. 
 
Geographical location appears to have been a stronger influence on investment flows 
into real estate investment than economic performance.  Key et al. (1998) report similar 
findings.  Using data from the IPD database, their analysis showed that the volume of 
office investment in individual local authorities in the UK is weakly associated with total 
employment, but quite strongly linked to total Financial and Business Services (FBS) 
employment, especially in London and its surrounding satellites, which account for 60% 
of total capital value in all Districts listed.  Additionally, they found find that although 
investment has tended to flow to ‘growth’ locations geographical location appears to   8
have been a stronger influence on investment flows than economic performance.  For 
instance, 24 out of the 26 Districts with the strongest investment inflows were virtually 
all in the South East.  Office investors have clearly favoured specific areas of the 
country as primary locations for their portfolios. 
 
A number of other studies clearly identify the central London office markets; the City, 
Mid-town and West End as being ‘different’.  Cullen (1993) argued that returns in the 
City office market show the greatest difference compared with the rest of the UK.   
Hoesli  et al. (1997) and Hamelink et al. (2000) find that the central London office 
market, and especially the City, behaves differently from the South East and the rest of 
the UK, the distinctiveness of London becoming stronger in the second half of their 
analysis period.  A similar pattern was found for the industrial property sector, which 
displayed a split into a London cluster, the fringe immediately around London and all 
other ‘peripheral’ markets.  In contrast the retail property markets clustered into a single 
group and failed to show a distinct London dimension, a result that still persisted with a 
more refined regional classification scheme.  Finally, Andrew et al., (2005) using 
individual property data over the period 1981-2003, found that “the three inner London 




3.  Data and Preliminary Analysis 
 
The preference of institutional investors for a limited set of urban areas is tested at two 
dates; 1998 and 2003, using two real estate data sources.  The analysis is confined to 
England and Wales because of data considerations relating to the availability of 
comparable data for the rest of the UK. 
 
The first dataset relates to floorspace and rateable value statistics for the so called 
‘bulk classes’ of commercial property at Unitary Authority and District (local authority 
area, LA) level. (ODPM, 2005).
5  Rateable values are the basis for the ‘Business Rate’, 
the commercial real estate tax in England and Wales.  The tax is factored on an 
assessment of ‘rateable value’ (RV), which in turn is derived from a hypothetical rental 
valuation of a unit of real estate known as an ‘hereditament’.  At the time of valuation 
this rateable value is often close to the open market rental value.  The valuation 
assessment is carried out at regular intervals of five years.  The latest relates to values 
in 2003, and came into legal force in 2005, but were unavailable in a form suitable for 
this study.  The data used in this paper are from the previous re-assessment carried 
out in 1998, which actually came into force for the determination of the Business Rate 
in 2000.  Although the rental valuation is carried out as at the base year, the aggregate 
statistics are updated annually and thus change as new hereditaments enter the 
database, and some drop out.  The data are broken down by sector; the data used 
here are for the office sector only.  There are several significant features of these data.  
First, they are, with some qualifications, a strong proxy for rental value, at least at 
points in time, and from the rental value the overall capital value may be estimated.  
Secondly, the rateable value of any hereditament in England and Wales is a public 
statistic, and can be obtained online or from the relevant local authority.  Finally, and 
perhaps in the context of this paper more important, the data are defined spatially, 
providing complete coverage for LAs in England and Wales. 
                                                  
5  The bulk class data are compiled by the Government through the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; 
(ODPM), on its own behalf and also on behalf of the Valuation Office Agency (VOA) in England and Wales 
(ODPM, 2005), but the data are now available though the UK Office of National Statistics (ONS) 
Neighbourhood Statistics (NeSS) website [http://www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/].   
These data are found from the NeSS homepage under ‘Topics’, in ‘Physical Environment’ - ‘Key 
Regeneration Related Statistics’, at various levels of aggregation.   9
 
The data used in this study are those relating to ‘Commercial’ Office hereditaments 
drawn from within the bulk Office class.  The hereditament as a spatial unit is difficult to 
define, but as a legal entity it consists essentially of one taxable occupancy.  This 
means that in some cases a building with several tenants may have multiple 
hereditaments.  Given this complication, these Commercial Office data are used here 
mainly to set a context for comparing the scale of institutional activity in particular LAs, 
since they do present good measures of the totality of relevant office space in a LA, 
even if an element of multiple counting may be present.  All the property which is of 
interest to an institutional investor will come from this category, which contains purpose 
built and converted offices and includes central government offices. 
 
In 2003 there were 264,503 Commercial Office hereditaments in England and Wales 
with a total floor space of 79.27m square metres; a total RV of £9.365bn and an 
estimated capital value of between £120 - 130bn. 
 
The institutional real estate investment data for this study come from the IPD analysis 
“UK Local Markets 2004” (IPD, 2004 with modifications).  This provides a detailed view 
of the performance of institutional real estate investment in a number of localities 
across the UK.  The results are presented annually for all LAs with four or more 
properties in institutional ownership.  Thus in 2003, for offices in England and Wales, 
there were data for 101 LAs, from a total of 376 (26.9%).  For the purposes of this 
study, IPD made data available showing (but with much less detail) other LAs where 
the number of properties held was greater than zero, but less than the four normally 
required for disclosure.  In 2003 there were 66 of these, making a total of 167 (44.4%) 
with some institutional ownership.  In the IPD universe in 2003 there were 2904 office 
properties in England and Wales with a total floor space of about 14.2m square metres 
and an estimated capital value of approximately £30bn. 
 
The comparator year is 1998, chosen because this is the year to which the rateable 
value data relates directly.  There are considerable differences between the Local 
Markets in the two years.  In 1998 there were 3764 offices with a total floor space of 
about 13.2m square metres and an estimated capital value of approximately £26.7bn.  
Thus while the number of offices in the IPD database fell by 23% between 1998 and 




4.  The Pattern of Institutional Office Investment in England and Wales 
 
In order to discover whether institutional investors concentrate their real estate 
portfolios in a rather small number of (urban) areas (as is clearly the case in the United 
States) the number of office properties in the IPD database in each of 376 LAs in 
England and Wales in 1998 and 2003 was established.  The results are presented in 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 and Tables 1 and 2. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 show the spatial distribution of office numbers across England and 
Wales in 1998 and 2003 respectively.  A considerable amount of concentration will be 
obvious immediately!  The nature of that concentration is discussed below.  Figure 3 
shows the spatial difference between Figures 1 and 2, indicating those areas where 
institutions changed the numbers of investments held between the two years.  This 
map should be viewed along side Table 2. 
 
Table 1 shows a number of features of interest.  Of the 376 LAs in England and Wales, 
the IPD data show 168 (45%) had no institutional office investment in 1998, while 260 Figure 1:  Numbers of Offices








 Figure 2:  Numbers of Offices








 Figure 3:   Changes in Holdings 1998-2003
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(68%) had three or less office holdings and 334 (89%) had less than 20 offices.  In 
Wales, 16 (72%) of the 22 authorities had no institutional office investment and 21 
(96%) had three or less, while only one local authority (Cardiff) had more than 20 
properties.  England had two LAs (Westminster and the City of London) with more than 
400 office holdings in 1998, but still had 152 (43%) of 354 authorities with no 
institutional office investment and 275 (78%) with less than 10 properties. 
 
Table 1:  Office Concentration in England and Wales:  1998 and 2003 
 
Num. of  England  Wales  E&W 
Offices  1998 2003 1998 2003 1998 2003 
0  152 190  16  19  168 209 
1-3 87  64  5  2  92  66 
4-9  36  43 -  - 36  43 
10-19 38  27 -  1 38  28 
20-39 26  16 1  - 27  16 
40-59 6 6 - - 6 6 
60-79 4 6 - - 4 6 
80-99 3 - - - 3 - 
100-199  - - - - - - 
200-399  - 1 - - - 1 
>400 2 1 - - 2 1 
Total  354 354  22  22  376 376 
 
 
Table 1 also shows that institutional office investment has become even more 
concentrated in a few ‘preferred’ areas.  By 2003, 209 (56%) of the LAs in England and 
Wales had no institutional office investment, a result reflected across both countries.  
England had 190 (54%) authorities with no institutional office investment.  The 
comparable figures for Wales show 19 authorities (86%) with no institutional 
investment by 2003.  The number of LAs with three or fewer office holdings fell by 
2003, while the number with 4-9 properties has increased.  Institutional investors have 
rationalised their office investments, eliminating many of those areas in which they had 
little investment previously, focussing on certain other areas by increasing their 
investment. 
 
The changes between 1998 and 2003 are shown more clearly in Table 2 and Figure 3. 
 
Table 2:  Changes in Office Allocation:  1998 to 2003 
 
Changes: 1998 to 2003  England Wales  E&W 
Unchanged: 180  18  198 
of which no holding on either date 144  16  160 
Reduced holding:  142  4  146 
of which holding reduced to zero  46  3  49 
Increased  holding:  32 - 32 
of which new allocation  8  -  8 
 
 
Table 2 shows that the majority of LAs saw no change; 198 (52%), or a decline; 146 
(39%) in allocation, with some areas; 49 (13%), seeing their holding fall to zero.  Wales 
was the bigger loser relatively, with Cardiff losing half its office investment over the five 
years between 1998 and 2003.  Nonetheless, some LAs; 32 (9%), did see a rise in 
investment.  These increases focused mainly in England with eight (2%) of the LAs 
showing an investment for the first time.  These changes result from positive 
reallocations by investors, but in some cases may also be a consequence of the   11
addition or removal of funds with holdings in these LAs from the IPD database or 
individual properties being sold to investors outside the database. 
 
Table 3 shows the concentration of institutional office investment in the top 30 LAs in 
1998 and 2003; as measured by the number of properties (No.), capital value (CV) and 
floor space (FS).   
 
Table 3:  Concentration in Top 30 Local Authorities:  1998 and 2003 
 
   1998    2003  
  No. CV FS No. CV FS 
Top  5 41% 58% 44% 40% 50% 40% 
Top  10  50% 67% 53% 50% 61% 51% 
Top  15  56% 73% 60% 58% 69% 59% 
Top  20  61% 77% 66% 64% 75% 65% 
Top  25  66% 81% 70% 68% 79% 69% 
Top  30  70% 84% 74% 72% 83% 73% 
 
 
Table 3, like Table 1 and Figure 1, shows that in 1998 institutional investment was 
concentrated in very few LAs, with the top five markets accounting for just over 40% of 
the institutional, as measured by number of properties or floor space, but 58% by 
value.  The top 10 markets accounted for about half the number of properties and floor 
space, but more than two-thirds of the value, while the top 30 LAs accounted for three-
quarters of the investment, by number and floor space, and 84% by value.  All of this 
suggests that institutions invest in very few offices in each LA which are high value and 
high quality investments.  These results for England and Wales are comparable with 
those in the US (see Shilton and Stanley, 1995; Shilton et al., 1996; Liang and 
McIntosh, 2000; and Frost et al., 2005). 
 
The figures for 2003 show very little change from those for 1998, if concentration is 
measured by the number of properties or floor space.  There is however a notable 
difference in the capital value figures between the two periods, especially for the top 10 
markets, which show a substantial fall in value from 1998.  This again supports the 
perception in Table 2 that institutional investors were rationalising their portfolios over 
this period. 
 
While Tables 1 to 3 show that investors focus on a limited number of LAs when 
investing in offices and that this focus has narrowed over time, they do not show the 
extent to which their investment is an over- or under-representation of office investment 
in a particular local authority relative to some measure of spatial spread across 
England and Wales.  In order to do this it is necessary to calculate location quotients 
(LQs).  A number of different LQs are calculated for each of the 375 LAs in England 
and Wales for which data were available
6: the number of offices; the market value; 
floor-space.  The first three approaches use data in the numerator and denominator 
that are as close as possible to each other in each case.  So for example, when the 
number of institutional office holdings from IPD is used in the numerator the number of 
hereditaments is the denominator.  The second LQ uses the IPD market values of the 
offices in the numerator and rateable value (as a proxy for capital value) in the 
denominator.  The third LQ uses institutional (IPD estimated) floor space and local 
authority floor space.  These three sets of LQ estimates therefore provide a more 
detailed view of the results presented in Tables 1 to 3.  The results of each LQ 
calculation for the 1998 and 2003 data are given in Table 4. 
                                                  
6  The Isles of Scilly are not included in the analysis as they had no office hereditaments in either period 
and so would invalidate any LQ calculation.   12
 
Table 4:  Office LQs in England and Wales:  1998 and 2003 
 
Panel A 
Including zeros  Average SD  Skew  T-stat.  P-value  Count 
1998           
No. of properties  0.51 0.93  2.80  10.20  0.000  375 
Capital value  0.26 0.50  3.14  28.77  0.000  375 
Floor space  0.38 0.64  2.64  18.58  0.000  375 
2003           
No. of properties  0.51  1.04 3.10 9.16 0.000 375 
Capital value  0.32 0.61  3.08  21.64  0.000  375 
Floor space  0.41 0.80  2.80  14.30  0.000  375 
Panel B 
Excluding zeros           
1998           
No. of properties  0.74  0.88 2.06 4.21 0.000 208 
Capital value  0.44 0.54  2.40  14.77  0.000  208 
Floor space  0.61  0.64 2.04 8.73 0.000 208 
2003           
No. of properties  0.80  0.93 2.01 2.76 0.006 167 
Capital value  0.64  0.68 2.16 6.78 0.000 167 
Floor space  0.74  0.79 1.79 4.17 0.000 167 
 
 
Table 4 presents summary statistics for the LQ calculations in 1998 and 2003.  As 
shown in Table 1, there are a large number of LAs that have no institutional office 
investment.  Therefore Table 4 presents two sets of statistics for each variable.  The 
first set is based on all observations including markets which have zero investment 
(Panel A).  A second set of complementary statistics (Panel B) are presented for the 
subset of LAs which have non-zero institutional commercial real estate investment. 
 
Panel A of Table 4 shows that all the LQ measures are significantly less than one.  This 
indicates that institutional investors were not fully diversified in either 1998 or 2003, 
although there has been a marginal increase in the average values since 1998.  The 
LQ based on capital value is exceptionally small in both periods (0.26 and 0.32 
respectively), suggesting that institutional investment is even more concentrated by 
capital value than would be implied from the market hereditament count; rateable value 
or floor space and confirms the results in Table 3.  All the LQs show significant positive 
skewness.  This suggests that there are some very large LQ values in some LAs.  This 
again reinforces the argument that a small number of office markets are the preferred 
locations for institutional investment.  The results presented in Panel B of Table 4, 
which exclude those markets with no institutional allocation, although having higher 
average LQs compared with Panel A, still show that institutional real estate portfolios 
are significantly under-diversified.  In addition, the positive skewness statistics indicate 
that even within the LAs that are favoured by institutions there are some markets that 
are more preferred to others.  Finally, the Spearman rank correlation between the 
various LQ statistics is very high
7 and suggests that, with a few exceptions, the 
different data sets provide similar measures of institutional office concentration across 
the UK. 
 
To make these LQ calculations comparable to those in the previous studies in the US 
the calculations are repeated, this time using the number of offices; the capital (market) 
                                                  
7  For example, the average Spearman rank correlation in 2003 is 0.954 and 0.883 for the two data sets 
which include and exclude zeros. 
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value; floor-space from the IPD data in the numerator, but with employment as the 
denominator.  The employment data for this analysis are taken from the ONS Nomis 
Labour Market Profile database [http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/].  The data used are 
Annual Business Inquiry Employee Analysis numbers of employee (available) jobs in 
each employment category.  They do not therefore relate directly to the employed 
population living in an authority, but are a measure of net employment for each of these 
kinds of activity in each LA (see Table 6). 
 
The results are presented in Table 5
8.  This gives the summary statistics for the LQ 
calculations in 1998 and 2003, using employment in the denominator.  Table 5, for 
reasons already discussed, presents two sets of statistics for each variable, one based 
on all observations including markets which have zero investment (Panel A) and a 
second set for the subset of LAs that have non-zero institutional investment (Panel B). 
 
This Table shows a broadly similar picture to that in Table 4.  Institutional office 
investment is significantly under-diversified and UK investors focus on a small number 
of preferred markets.  These employment LQs are also comparable with the results in 
the US (see in particular Malpezzi and Shilling, 2000).  Nonetheless, the average 
employment LQs in Table 5 are all substantially larger than their equivalent values in 
Table 4.  This implies that institutional office investment is more evenly spread across 
England and Wales in terms of employment than it is in comparison to the office 
hereditament count.  In other words, institutions focus their office investment in high 
employment areas and larger offices, rather than areas with a smaller number of 
workers but a large number of small offices. 
 
Table 5:  Employment LQs in England and Wales:  1998 and 2003 
 
Panel A 
Including zeros  Average SD  Skew  T-stat. P-value Count 
1998            
No. of properties  0.56 1.17  4.24  7.38 0.000  376 
Capital value  0.44 1.46  8.34  7.37 0.000  376 
Floor space  0.52 1.32  7.33  7.04 0.000  376 
2003            
No. of properties  0.55 1.25  3.90  7.00 0.000  376 
Capital value  0.48 1.39  5.20  7.24 0.000  376 
Floor space  0.54 1.28  4.36  6.94 0.000  376 
Panel B 
Excluding zeros            
1998            
No. of properties  0.72 1.01  3.35  4.05 0.000  208 
Capital value  0.57 1.35  6.42  4.57 0.000  208 
Floor space  0.67 1.19  5.93  4.01 0.000  208 
2003            
No. of properties  0.77 1.01  2.67  3.00 0.003  167 
Capital value  0.67 1.19  3.49  3.58 0.000  167 
Floor space  0.75 1.05  3.04  3.02 0.003  167 
 
 
The Spearman rank correlation between the LQ statistics based on employment data in 
Table 5 and those based the number of hereditaments, rateable value, and floor-space 
                                                  
8  Initially Population was used as the denominator as in previous US studies (Malpezzi and Shilling, 2000 
and Byrne, et al., 2002), but this caused a serious problem for a number of markets, especially the City of 
London which has an extremely small population but an extremely high office allocation in institutional 
portfolios and so displayed an extreme LQ (in excess of 200!).  The results using numbers of jobs 
(employment) are more supportable.   14
shown in Table 4 is very high
9 and suggests that the employment data LQs can be 
used as an appropriate measure of office concentration. 
 
Figure 4 complements the earlier Figures and provides at least a partial explanation of 
the patterns of holdings seen in those maps.  In Figure 4, the darker the shading, the 
higher the capital value/employment LQ. 
 
The top two institutional office markets, are the City of London (14.1) and Westminster 
(10.2), i.e. the institutional investment, by value, in these areas is more than 10 times 
that implied by the LAs employment.  They therefore represent the first tier of 
institutional office investment and demonstrate that these two office markets are unique 
in their own right, even within London. 
 
There is then a clear break to the next market, Reading (8.8), and three other locations, 
Bracknell Forest (6.4): Watford (6.2); and Islington (6.1).  These markets showing LQ 
level well above the next group but clearly below the top tier.  The next level is made 
up of 13 LAs with LQs above 3 but below 6.  Below this are a further 25 LAs with LQs 
above 1 but well below 3.  This suggests that institutional investors prefer to invest in 
just 44 LAs (11.7%) in England and Wales
10. 
 
There are 22 LAs with LQs below 1 but greater than 0.5.  Then there are 101 LAs with 
LQs below 0.5.  These are areas in which, for whatever reason, the institutions have a 
presence but one that cannot be justified by the area’s employment level.  This leaves 
over 200 LAs with no institutional office holdings. 
 
                                                  
9  The average Spearman rank correlation between the employment based LQs in 2003 and the LQs 
based on hereditaments, rateable value, and floor-space is 0.807 and 0.793 for the two data sets which 
include and exclude zeros. 
 
10  In fact these 44 are all in England with Cardiff ranked 52nd. Figure 4:  Capital Value  / Employment LQs
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The Characteristics of Institutional Office Markets 
 
Previous studies show that the preferred markets for institutional real estate investment 
have distinctive economic features such as urban areas with high business services 
employment and a concentration on the largest cities.  For England and Wales in 2003 
the results are similar - as shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6:  The Characteristics of Institutional Investment Markets:  2003 
 
Characteristic / LQ  Zero  >0 <0.5  >0.5 <1  >1 <3  >3 <6  >6 <10  >10 
              
Average Rateable Value (£ 000)  3952 16361 33788 87651 65510 93541  1304018 
Average No. of Hereditaments  361 813  941 1880 931 1412  11560 
Average Floor Space (000m
2)  18 26  38  39  43  47  47 
              
Average Total Employment  42895 82152  85837 142456 71961  98411  472324 
% in Manufacturing  16.05  11.43  9.52 8.85 7.15 6.63  1.90 
% in Construction  4.78  4.39 4.06 3.61 3.64 3.57  0.48 
% in Tourism  8.52  7.59 7.13 7.25 8.22 5.41  7.97 
% in Distribution, Hotels & 
Restaurants  24.53 24.52  23.79  22.28  24.31  23.21  15.51 
% in Transport & 
Communications  4.94  5.41 5.30 6.90 7.99 7.69  3.35 
% in Finance, IT, Other 
Business Activities  11.82 17.48  23.00  24.43  24.95  30.08  55.52 
% in Public Admin, Education 
& Health  24.82 24.41  22.44  21.97  17.44  19.17  9.85 
% in Other  4.54  4.76 4.77 4.71 6.30 4.24  5.42 
 
 
Table 6 uses the same categories as in Figure 4 and shows that institutions prefer LAs 
that have larger numbers of employees in Finance, IT, other business activities (FIRE) 
and tourism and substantially lower percentages in manufacturing and public 
administration, i.e. institutions invest in large urban areas with a high business services 
employment, matching the findings in the US.  In addition, the LA has to have a large 
number of sizeable offices (hereditaments), i.e. investors want to invest in the bigger 
office blocks. 
 
Given this basic distribution of office investment in England and Wales an attempt has 
been made to model the office investment data for 2003 using a regression-based 
approach with Capital Value/Employment LQ as the dependent variable against the 
variables set out in Table 6.  The results are presented in Table 711. 
 
The results in Table 7 show that the extent of office investment can be explained 
significantly by very few variables, i.e. rateable value (RV), average floor space (AFS), 
and the percentage of the urban areas employment in Finance, IT, other business 
activities (FIRE) and Public Administration, Education and Health (PADMIN).  The 
coefficient of determination of the regression is high at 65%, the variables show the 
correct sign and are all significant at the usual levels. 
                                                  
11  As is to be expected there is a good deal of multi-collinearity among the explanatory variables.  As a 
consequence a number of models could and were developed but the model presented in Table 7 was 
chosen as it has the variables identified in Table 6 which discriminate among the LA’s areas in terms of 
office investment by the institutions in the UK.   16
 
Table 7:  Regression Results 
 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error t-Statistic  Prob. 
Constant  -0.61 0.24 -2.52 0.01 
RV  0.00 0.00  14.77  0.00 
AFS  0.03 0.01 5.70 0.00 
FIRE  0.03 0.01 3.46 0.00 
PADMIN  -0.01 0.01 -1.79 0.07 
 
 
The main advantage of the analysis is that LAs that have either an over representation 
of institutional office investment or LAs that are under represented can then be 
identified.  The results are shown in Table 8 for the top and bottom 10 LA’s. 
 
 
Table 8:  The Top and Bottom 10 LA’s for Institutional Office Investment:  2003 
 
 Top  10   Bottom  10 
1  Reading UA  10  Swindon UA 
2  Watford  9  Blaby 
3  Bracknell Forest UA  8  South Cambridgeshire 
4  Richmond upon Thames  7  Harlow 
5  Spelthorne  6  Halton UA 
6  Islington  5  Wokingham UA 
7  Elmbridge  4  Lambeth 
8  Windsor and Maidenhead UA  3  Camden 
9  Runnymede  2  Vale of White Horse 
10  Surrey Heath  1  Tower Hamlets 
 
Note:  UA – Unitary Authority 
 
The LQs in Tables 4 and 5 show which LAs have most investment relatively, but do not 
indicate whether this investment is inconsistent with the characteristics of the LA.  For 
example although the City of London has the highest LQ, the regression characteristics 
of this LA are very close to those that the institutions prefer.  Consequently the 
regression analysis identifies the City of London as an ideal location for institutional 
investment in that it has a great number of large financial service offices.  In contrast 
the regression analysis identifies Reading as having institutional office investment 
greatly in excess of its locational characteristics.  This is presumably due to the 
ownership of large amounts of office space by Prudential which treats Reading 
effectively as its second headquarters.  On the other hand, Tower Hamlets ranks as the 
most under-represented LA, in this case because, although Tower Hamlets contains 





Over the last ten to fifteen years many researchers have examined the structure of the 
major commercial real estate investment markets, paying much attention both to the 
extent to which risk diversification is possible in the market and to attempts at devising 
strategies that allow fund managers to decide ‘where’ (as well as when) they should 
invest in order to take maximum advantage from diversifying.  In the growing literature 
on spatial real estate diversification strategies, an important sub-set of research has   17
started to examine whether institutional investors concentrate their real estate holdings 
in preferred regions when diversifying their portfolios. 
 
In summary, the data in the UK, in so far as they are available, that is, from the IPD 
universe, indicate that investors have either ignored the warnings of the impact of 
portfolio investment in areas displaying a similar economic base, or find it difficult for 
one reason or another to follow such advice.  As a consequence many institutional 
commercial real estate portfolios are concentrated, and therefore must not be 
diversified efficiently. 
 
In particular, institutional investors focus on a very few (urban) areas in England and 
Wales, (and indeed in Scotland and Northern Ireland) which display a limited set of 
economic characteristics; a large number of big offices spaces, and a heavy 
concentration of FIRE employment.  In other words, institutional investment is 
concentrated in the biggest (most liquid) financial office market areas, confirming 
anecdotal indications. 
 
The role that institutional investors play in structuring the built environment within 
regions is complex and varies enormously from area to area.  Although this paper 
seems to suggest that the manner of stock selection, at least in respect to office 
investments is rather uncomplicated, more work is necessary to understand the impact 
that any local market’s socio-economic characteristics have on institutional office 











This work is based in part on data provided through EDINA UKBORDERS with the 
support of the ESRC and JISC and uses boundary material which is copyright of the 
Crown. 
 
The authors would like to thank IPD, and Steven Devaney in particular, for providing 
the ‘full’ data sets on offices for the two years studied.  The usual disclaimers apply. 
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